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SUMMARY
em_,
Studies of human factors in aircraft accidents provide a substantial
yield of human errors which contributed to those accidents. It is probable,
however, that accidents are the least common of the outcomes which can follow
a human error in the aviation system. An epidemiological model for the study
of human errors in aviation is presented. In this approach, retrospective
data are used as the basis for formulation of hypotheses as to system factors
which may have contributed to such errors. Prospective experimental studies
of aviation operations are also required in order to prove or disprove the
hypotheses, and to evaluate the effectiveness of intervention techniques
designed to solve operational problems in the aviation system.
INTRODUCTION
This paper is designed to accomplish two objectives. Its first intent
is to present human error in aviation in terms of an analogy which may be
useful in attacking the problem of human errors and their effects upon
: aviation safety. Its second purpose is to present a systematic methodology
=, for the attack upon this omnipresent problem.
" BACKGROUND
_ Studies of aviation safety over the years have nearly all had certain
common attributes. Nearly all such studies have focused upon aircraft
accidents. Nearly all have been essentially descriptive, though the recent
study by Kowalsky et al. at the Lovelace Foundation utilized sophisticated
analytic techniques in an attempt to elucidate factors associated with the
sample of accidents under study. Most of these studies, like most accident
investigations, have had to rely heavily upon inference to determine what
went on prior to the accident itself.
There have been many studies of accidents in other forms of transporta-
tion and in industry. They have given rise to various theories about the
persons _d circumstances in which accidents are especially likely to occur,
but none, to our knowledge, has withstood the test of time. Is it possible
_, that attempts to improve accident statistics have not been more successfu]
! because attention has been focused upon tilewrong phenomenon, or upon only
one facet of the overall problem?
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=_i: Since the introduction of turbojet aircraft into civil transport, between
. 60 and 70% of all fatal accidents in airline transport have been attributed
; in whole or part to human error. The figures for general aviation are
!:,_, substantially higher. The problem of human error, then, is clearly the most
_;:.- serious one facing the aviation industry.
;_ Yet while case studies of aircraft accidents are a convenient and highly:
i:, productive method of collecting instances of human error in aviation, it is
_:. less generally acknowledged that an accident is only one- and the least
I_ common -- of the outcomes which can result from a human error in the aviation
:,I_,
i _" system. A human error may cause a perturbation in the aviation system, but
i i> under circumstances which allow time and space for recovery. More frequently "_'
; :;' still, the error may occur, be detected, diagnosed and corrected or compen-
_.._.'
' _ sated for without a significant perturbation in the system. There is an
_! analog to this in clinical medicine, in which symptoms and sometimes signs
I'[i of illness may occur. They may progress to a fatal outcome; they may heralda significant illness from which recovery occurs, or they may appear, be
compensated for by the physiological reserves of the body and disappear with-
l out a significant disturbance of overall function.
SYSTEM DETECTION, FATAL ILLNESS, NO
i.__ ACCIDENT PERTURBATION CORRECTION OUTCOME THEN RECOVERY ILLNESS
(RAREI (MORECOMMON) (MOSTCOMMON) _ /
"-.. t SYMPTOMS/.//"
• HUJAN/'" ANDSIGNS
'i'.' ERRORi If one is to understand the problem of human error, it would seem
_. necessary to examine cases in which recovery occurred, as well as those
which had a fatal outcome. What factors differentiate these classes of
errors? Or are they but one class occurring under different sets of circum-
stances? Or to different sorts of people who respond differently?
SYSTEM DETECTION. FATAL I LLNESS. NO
:' ACCIDENT PERTURBATION CORRECTION OUTCOME RECOVERY ILLNESS
HUMAN /
ERROR SYM OMS
l AND ilGNSPREDISPOSINGCONDITION,
ATTITUDE, DISEASE
i', SET PROCESS
if; " More important still is the question of what a human error is. Is it a
I[ spontaneous phenomenon -- an intermittent disorder which affects people at
:,: random? Or can its occurrence be predicted? If so, by what criteria? Or
_ is an error but a manifestation -- a symptom -- of some underlying disorder in
_oI!. the human mind or body? If so, can we gain an insight into the disease, or• diseases, which give rise to these ubiquitous symptoms?
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It is instructive to consider human error as a manif_staCion, or sympton,
occurring in the presence of a variety of human conditlons, which by virtue of ''
its occurrence produces at least a potential perturbation of the man-machlne
system of which the human is a part. That perturbation may lead to any of a
variety of outcomes. Viewed in this manner, it becomes possible to examine
the human attributes and attitudes which give rise to errors. More impor-
tant, it becomes possible to look beyond the human to the environment in
which he is operating, in order to discern factors which may make it more
likely that he will err, or less likely that he will recover given an error.
SYSTEM FATAL ILLNESS, NO SIGNIFICAN1
ACCIDENT PERTURBATION CORRECTION OU]_COME RECOVt RY ILLNESS
l t I...- s j
"_ HUMAN //,+, _ SYMPTOMS /"
ERROR AND SIGNS
t IPREDISPOSING
CONDITION, DISEASE
ATTITUDE, 7 PROCESS '_ .
.-*' MENTAL SET '%-_ ./ --.
OPERA [IONAL PHYSICAL SOCIAL PHYSICAL
ENVIROP,IMENT ENVIRONMENT ENVIRONMENT F NVIRONMENT
There is a powerful methodological tool for dealing wlth this sort of
problem. Epldemiology is conventionally thought of as a tool for dealing
with polnt-source epidemics of disease, but it is much more. Epldemlologlcal
methods have been used successfully for over a century to examine factors in
the environment which contribute to a great variety of problems which beset
man and animals; present concerns under concerted attack using these methods
include the problems of heart disease, cancer, alcoholism and drug addiction,
among non-lnfectlous illnesses. Using epidemlologlcal methods, it is possible
to examine symptoms in terms of the diseases which produce them, and to study
diseases in terms of the factors which determine their incidence, prevalence
• and often their outcome.
METHODOLOGY
When one is investigating a fatal aircraft accident, it is often neces-
sary to infer the behavior which preceded It. It is more difficult st111 to
infer with any accuracy the attitudes or attributes whlch may l.lvu determJned
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O_£11111HN_lfi AC(IUINIIi or c.ntrJ.but_,d tn tilt' I)(qmvt()r whl_'h
pr<-,tumlably catm¢_d Lilt. _wcl+dullt. Ewm i
HI'-.I(II1Y ()IITI_OMI "f";I"VA,l'm wlth cockpit voJt'o rt,cord(,rf_, ht.lplttJ ]
l though they I|avo ht_ull, th¢, r(,tr(,lq)t,(,-I
"/ O''MIIVAIION 11414011 ClNIIHINI:II t[V(' V,|(-,W of tl|t, eotrkl)Jt IH /l_ hi,if|l
] t_lt)tltled and fragmont:ary. It lnttHl _|JHo
': b_ l)Otntod out that hindsight J._ not
III_IO,IY PIH I)ItIPIIBINÁi Ii nucem.mrtly hettur than for(,Hlght.
] They are fundamentally different pro-
IINIIIHNCI, INVIIIONMINIAt (INI|IH,NCll tosses. The occurrence of I1 cortfl]llFACIOII8
outcome following the demonstratlon
of a particular phenomenon does not necessarily indicate that the outcome
was causally related to the phenomenon, tempting as it may be to draw that
conclusion.
It is possible to minimize bias due to this sort of reasoning by exam- i
ining errors which did not lead to fatal accidents, though the possibility
exists that the errors are of different classes, and therefore, not comparable.
One very effective way to do this is by direct contact with the pilots and
air traffic controllers who have committed the errors. While results with
this method are not free of blas_ injected either by the reporter or the
: interviewer, it is possible under the right circumstances to determine fairly
._ precisely what occurred, how it occurred, and sometimes why it occurred. It
is usually possible to gain an appreciation of the environment in which the
; error took place. Sometlmes_ though by no means always_ one can gain an
: understanding of the psychosocial setting and background of the occurrence.
The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System, and the fllght crew interview
studies which preceded it, are attempts to collect a large and comprehensive
sample of occurrences in the aviation system, with enough detall about how
: and why they happened to permit reasonable inferences to be drawn about
:, system factors associated with such occurrences. This voluntaryD conflden-),
tlal reporting system was implemented in April, 1976. The System is designed
_, to collect,analyze and disseminate information regarding potential hazards i
_,. in the aviation system so that appropriate action can be taken to correct I
i problems and thus prevent aircraft accidents. In its first six months of
operation, the Aviation Safety Reporting System has received over 2900 reports 1
describing potential threats to aviation safety.
Prelimlnary analysis of these reports indicates that a considerable
fraction of them describe human errors, often in great detail. It has been
learned that those who live and work in the aviation system will discuss
• mistakes they have madeD often in exhaustive depth. There is great wllllng-
tess to examine and analyze the possible reasons for these mistakes. It is
also clear that "trivial" errors, given enough of them, may have catastrophic
outcomes; study of accidents suggests that no type of human error in aviation
should be considered too trivial for detailed study.
__ Using these techniques, it can be inferred that certain problems in the
aviation environment are commonly associated with human errors In aviation
_=:' operations. Problems in the transfer of information to those responsib]e
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: I
00000008-TSC10
for tactical tloeinion_ilaking, as an instance, appear in nearly 50 percent
of thfa h,man _rror incidents examined in de.tall to date, This, in turn, hen
led to quire,ions about the typos of informationwhich are necessary for
offlclent operations, the ways in which such informaq;ion can best be made
available to those who need .It, and the best ways to present it when i.t t.s
c_allcd for.
But inference is not enough, and historical data, however provocatiw;,
proves only tlmt an association exists between a factor and a mnnifestation.
It remains to be proven whether that factor is causally, or non-causally, i
related to the phenomenon under study. Especially :Lna very complex man- .. i!
machine system such as the aviation system, where many factors are inter- i
dependent and therefore correlated, it is necessary to take a rigorous
approach toward the question of cause and effect, for nmnipulatlon of the I
wrong variable in search of a solution is expensive and may cause more
problems than it solves. There is evidence that this has occurred in the
area of alerting and warning systems.
It is necessary to construct a rig- o.st.vA_,.N 0111C|)MI
orous set of hypotheses and to design
t e'
experiments with great care if one is to OLSC..U,.N | RHOI,
be able to sort out the various factors .
which may have produced or contributed ' "ANALYSIS r INI! IIVI NIl(IN *
to a particular unwanted effect in the P,_tOIS,'OSIN,_CONt,I_I,,NS
aviation system• Even then, it may be _ItYI'OIH[ SIS 4" •
difficult to partition out the variance PHUOI- I NVIRONMt NIAL
associated with uncontrolled variables , . !ACUmS[ X!'[I_IIMINT
in the complex environment of aviation
operations. It has berome clear_ however, that such experiments are abso-
lutely necessary, thgc they can be performed in a setting which has face
validity, and that they can contribute measurably to our understanding of
the root causes of human errors in the aviation system. The report which
follows (ref. I) describes a first effort to examine the question of infor-
mation transfer in the airline cockpit. It illustrates the concepts, tech-
niques, and some of the problems involved in such epidemlologlcal research.
RESUM_
5YSTrM
To summarize, then : several ACCIDI[NT PLR1UHBATION COtUIIt_TION
assumptlons have been made ill order _ ¢ "
to try to understand more clearly
the problem of human error in aria- HUMAN
Lion operatlolls. It has been assumed, tl, aOtt
first, that errors do not "Just hap- J
pen." They art, rather manifestations _mo,m,s,_,;(:| INt)l I ION
ot tht' human condition, attitude or ,xtr,rtJ.t
mental set at a part [cular time. That , _tNlat st !
condition is tn turn the result of a
cons tderM_te number of intt,rnal "and
external, or (,nvJronmt_ntlll, factors• OPINATIIINA( I'IIY't_ILAI! NVIII(INM! NI I NVIII(INM{ N|
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It h/_s boon asFmmad further that the h_mt, albeit an ]mp.rfc.ct, ,-.m_co
of information about the factol:n contrlbutln_, to human error I:-,tl_(,l,_,r_;or,
who committed the error. We are aware, that the.; r(:,portcr may I)1,',_, 1,1_; r,q,.rr.
bu_ wq_ know of no mor_ auOlontlc nourco.
We have _llHtt|IIled that p(._rsont_ _.n the ,_v.latlon .yf_t,,m wl,(,v,.,lmll i,_,I
Infornm_ion in c;lrcum_tancet_ which do _)ot Jnvulv,, l_crm, n:_.l r lf;l_ tl(, _,.., t.r
fun(lamentally altrul_tic motiwm. They w.l.ll th(-.rofm'v .tt,(.,mp! i_, b_, truthful
in their reporting. We are eoncerm.,d about certnlu f;lceI::-_ _,1 t.h,., Avlat. l(.m
Safety Reporting System which require reporting a. a pre r t, qu I liJ t _, I o ,ivoJd-
ante of discipl.inary action, for we have been unable tim. I;lr to ,,w, lu,'_tt, ..
possible bias due to this factor. Wu hope In tht, near futur[, t,_ CLU|,ItIt'.|, ;1
study which amy shed some light on this problem.
We have assumed that the population of errors from which our sample i_
drawn contains also the errors which under specific clrcumstance_; can lead
to aircraft accidents. While there is suggestive evt(lenc_ _ that this assump-
tlon is Justified, there may be specific types of errors which we are not
sampling and our conclusions may be biased by the nonrepresentatlvenem_ el
tile population and, therefore, of our sample. The study to which we referred
will examine this question as well.
Finally, we have assumed that the concepts and methods oi classical
epldemlology are appropriate tools for this research. We have assumed that
if we choose appropriate hypotheses to explain the phenomena we are
examining and inject the appropriate factors in a valid simulated operational
setting, we shall be able to observe the phenomena of interest, in at least
one experiment thus far, this appears to have been true. If we can now
design an appropriate and specific intervention technique to neutralize the
hypothesized effect of these factors, repeat the experiment and observe a
change in the effect, we believe we shall have reasonably firm evidence that
the factor causes the effect, together with some data regarding ways uf
mitigating the effect 'a aviation operations.
This is the task we have set ourselves: to attempt, by understanding
the factors which cause human errors, to remove or ameliorate the unwanted
effects of those factors and thus, hopeful]y, to make it less likely that
serious errors will be committed. We also believe that an understondlng of
the causes of human error can enable us to design better and more rational
methods of coping with the errors when they do occur, in order to improve the
likelihood of a uniformly successful outcome. There are nmny potential
points of attack upon a disease once tile genesis and course of that diueJse
are understood. Without such understanding, it is nearly Impo_:s]b], _ to
' provide more than symptomatic relief from its effects.
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